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Abstract 
We study the introduction of the private logic into a mature Italian hospital that was governed previously 
as a hybrid of professional and public logics. Intriguingly, the reconstituted hospital was for several 
years widely praised for its strong clinical and financial performance, but quickly and with little warning 
became riven by political differences that led to its demise. Through our case analysis, we develop a 
multi-level model that reveals the destabilizing process that can unfold when a new logic enters an 
established organization. We contribute to the hybrids literature by explaining the puzzle of how a new 
logic can become accepted and then rejected in organizations, emphasizing the critical importance of 
the interaction between the audience, organization, and practice levels. Crucially, we reveal that positive 
feedback from multiple audiences may be a mixed blessing for hybrids: while it offers resource and 
legitimacy advantages, it can induce internal tensions with severe destabilizing consequences. Our 
findings and model also run counter to two core assumptions within the institutional literature: that 
social endorsement is advantageous, and that alignment with institutional expectations results in 
stabilization. We qualify these assumptions and indicate the circumstances under which they are 
unlikely to hold.  
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From Logic Acceptance to Logic Rejection: The Process of Destabilization in Hybrid 
Organizations 
Introduction 
Organization theory has long recognized that many organizations confront environments in which 
independent audiences make uncoordinated and inconsistent demands (D’Aunno et al. 1991). Recently, 
there has been a resurgence of interest in understanding how such competing demands can be reconciled 
– an issue defined within institutional theory as coping with multiple institutional logics. A particular 
focus of this work has been on “hybrid” organizations that incorporate two or more logics (Battilana et 
al. 2017) and which are often promoted as a means to address deep-rooted societal problems beyond 
the capability of traditionally arranged organizations (Jay 2013). 
However, accommodating multiple logics within the same organization can be problematic, 
especially in situations where a new logic is introduced. Hybrids often display an inability to reconcile 
different audience expectations and have been shown to compromise anticipated benefits, leading to 
organizational paralysis or even breakup (Tracey et al. 2011). In light of these difficulties, and given 
the growing importance of multi-logic organizational forms in market economies, a critical question is 
how such organizations can combine multiple logics, and do so sustainably (Battilana and Lee 2014).  
The initial motivation for this paper was to extend theory through an exploratory ethnographic study 
of an Italian hospital that in 2004 added the private logic to its incumbent professional and public logics. 
By 2010, when we began data collection, the hospital was widely praised and declared a regional center 
of excellence. There were no obvious indications of internal struggles. Our intention, therefore, was to 
understand how the private logic became accepted in a hospital that belonged to a public health system 
where medical professionals had long been the dominant voice.  
Four months after entering the field, however, the hospital was riven by political differences over 
arrangements initially perceived as instrumental to the hospital’s strong clinical and financial 
performance. This happened even though no changes were made to the hospital’s formal governance 
and management arrangements, or to the composition of its leadership team. As a result of the 
contestation that followed, the private logic was formally withdrawn, private investment ceased, and 
most hospital practices and decision-making processes reverted in 2015 to their earlier status. These 
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unexpected developments presented an unusual opportunity to explore both the adoption and the 
expulsion of a new logic in a mature hybrid. We therefore focused on the following research questions: 
How can a new logic be effectively introduced into a mature hybrid organization? What factors can 
disturb a well-functioning hybrid and lead to the subsequent rejection of a newly introduced logic?  
In addressing these questions, we contribute to the literature on hybrids by developing a process 
model that theorizes the dynamics that unfold when a new logic enters an existing organization. Our 
model emphasizes the importance of the ongoing relationships between the audience, organization and 
practice levels of analysis. Specifically, we show that when incoming actors engage in a strategy of 
assurance and are careful to ensure that incumbents’ maintain discretion over core practices, they can 
overcome audience skepticism and persuade incumbents that the role of the incoming logic is to support 
them. If all groups enjoy mutual gains, these mechanisms facilitate the smooth introduction of the 
incoming logic and the effective functioning of the new hybrid arrangement.     
Counterintuitively, however, when audiences confer acclamation on the organization, standards of 
performance are compromised. This happens because the desire of organizational members to receive 
continued praise is powerfully seductive and leads to narrower attention as actors focus upon those 
audiences whose praise they deem most important. Crucially, this narrowing of attention prompts 
incoming actors to undermine incumbents’ discretion over core practices in an effort to extend the 
influence of the new logic. Criticism from audiences that reveals deteriorating performance triggers 
logic contestation and fractures relationships between the proponents of the logics. At the same time, 
incumbents reassert their discretion over core practices in order to reclaim their authority. The result 
is that incumbents blame the new logic and reject it, and the original hybrid arrangement is restored. 
Through our process model, we contribute to the hybrid organizing literature by showing that 
positive feedback from multiple audiences may be a mixed blessing: while it offers resource and 
legitimacy advantages (Scott, 2008), it can induce internal tensions with severe destabilizing 
consequences. We also contribute to institutional theory more broadly. Specifically, our findings and 
model run counter to two assumptions within the institutional literature: that social endorsement is 
advantageous (Deephouse et al. 2017); and, that alignment with institutional prescriptions results in 
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stabilization (Greenwood et al. 2011). We qualify these assumptions and indicate the circumstances 
under which they are unlikely to hold.  
Theoretical Context 
Institutional logics are the socially constructed, historical patterns of beliefs and material practices that 
guide behavior, shape interactions and relationships, and provide meaning to social reality (Friedland 
and Alford 1991, Thornton et al. 2012). They convey the salience of particular issues in an institutional 
setting, specify the appropriate modes of organizing, and define the standards of success (Smets et al. 
2012). As such, logics have a powerful influence on the direction and priorities of organizations. A 
feature of contemporary society is the increasing use of organizational forms – hybrids – that combine 
logics (Pache and Santos 2010). A notable example of this trend has been the incorporation of a private 
(market) logic within organizations where that logic was not only previously absent, but considered an 
anathema. For example, the private logic has been introduced into publicly funded hospitals and 
healthcare systems around the world (Maarse 2006), is now a prevalent arrangement for the delivery of 
educational services (Ball 2007), social welfare (Dowling et al. 2004) and transportation (Martimort 
and Pouyet 2008), and is even used in prisons (Yescombe 2011). 
The growing interest in multi-logic organizational forms is motivated by the possibility that 
combining logics will open up new ways of approaching intractable societal problems. A core 
assumption is that bringing apparently incompatible logics together will not only generate new ideas 
but also encourage organizational members to appreciate their complementarity (Dalpiaz et al. 2016, 
Jay 2013, McPherson and Sauder, 2013, Smets and Jarzabkowski 2013, York et al. 2016). However, 
fusing logics is a complex task: hybrids are often a “locus of disorder” and signally fail to meet their 
aspirations (Battilana and Lee 2014, p. 398).  
Tensions and disagreements between competing interest groups within organizations have, of 
course, long been acknowledged. For example, Burns and Stalker (1961) explicitly referred to 
organizations as “political systems” (see also Cyert and March 1963, Selznick 1949). Indeed, virtually 
all organizations operate with tensions arising from ideological differences, and researchers have 
explored how organizations cope with these tensions from various perspectives (Clegg et al. 2006). 
However, the institutional approach is distinctive in that such tensions are assumed to arise from two 
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discrete challenges: the need to acquire legitimacy from external audiences, and the need to reach an 
internal agreement between the organizational actors who promote the various logics (Pache and Santos 
2010, Ramus et al. 2017).  
Externally, hybrid organizations seek social endorsement from field-level advocates of each of the 
logics represented within the organization. Such endorsement is crucial because it allows organizations 
to acquire the requisite resources to function effectively, and failure to do so can have serious 
implications (Deephouse et al. 2017). However, accommodating the tugs and pulls of disparate 
audiences can be a significant challenge (D’Aunno et al. 1991). Internally, the challenge is to construct 
an acceptable accommodation between those promoting the different logics, which is not 
straightforward because tensions over core goals and their associated incentive systems often lead to 
competing claims about priorities and objectives (Jay 2013, Pache and Santos 2013, Ramus et al. 2017). 
Thus, hybrids have to reach a “settlement” (Rao and Kenney 2008) on the relative prioritization to be 
given to the constituent logics.  
Scholars have identified several means by which these external and internal challenges can be 
addressed. This work has advanced our understanding of the coping strategies that allow hybrid 
organizations to attain their goals despite the risk of contestation (Dalpiaz et al. 2016, Kaplan 2008, 
Lounsbury 2007, McPherson and Sauder 2013, Pache and Santos 2013, Smets and Jarzabkowski 2013). 
Nevertheless, current research suffers from at least three weaknesses.  
First, implicit in much of the literature is that multi-logic organizations are “born” as hybrids. 
However, many organizations only become hybridized later in their lifecycles. As Dunn and Jones 
(2010) suggest, integrating a new logic into a mature organization might be especially difficult, 
particularly if that logic has been vilified (Smets et al. 2012). Moreover, this challenge is heightened in 
organizations dominated by professionals who can be highly resistant to change and often lack the 
requisite suppleness to accommodate new ideas and ways of working (Ferlie et al. 2005, Reay et al. 
2006). 
Second, most empirical studies have focused on hybrids whose constituent logics are integrated 
effectively (see Battilana et al. 2017 for a review) but give little attention to the temporal unfolding of 
hybridization and/or de-hybridization; i.e., they do not consider how inherent political tensions might 
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rise over time, nor take account of circumstances that might amplify or suppress them. As a 
consequence, we have limited understanding of the processes through which initially well-functioning 
hybrids might later unravel and why they might do so. This lack of attention is surprising in light of 
growing evidence that many hybrids are profoundly unstable (Hodge and Greve 2007) and that initially 
effective settlements are often unsustainable in the long-term (Ball 2007).  
Third, although research has recognized that relationships between organizations and the fields to 
which they belong are of profound importance, most studies of hybrids tend to ignore the role of 
feedback – both positive and negative – from external audiences. The interaction of the external and 
internal tensions confronting hybrids, in consequence, has been neglected – giving an incomplete 
account. This is problematic because the relationship between organizations and their institutional 
context is a central theme of institutional theory, and audience feedback plays a fundamental role in 
shaping this relationship (Hinings et al. 2017, Scott 2013). 
In sum, we still know relatively little about how mature organizations can effectively introduce a 
previously alien logic, and the circumstances that might subsequently undermine any settlement that is 
reached. Our purpose here, therefore, is to draw upon a case study of an Italian hospital to explain how 
and why an incoming logic was embraced by incumbent members, only to be abruptly rejected by them 
at a later point, precipitating the collapse of the new hybrid arrangement.  
Methods 
Given our focus upon an unexplored phenomenon we relied upon an inductive research design based 
on a combination of ethnographic and longitudinal methods (Glaser and Straus 1967). Our setting is 
particularly compelling because it concerns an attempt to introduce a third logic into a mature, 
professional organization. Moreover, it contains the puzzle of acceptance followed by rejection.  
Research Setting  
This study was conducted at R-Hospital (pseudonym), a rehabilitation hospital in Italy. Healthcare 
in Italy is deeply institutionalized as a publicly funded system based on the principles of universal 
coverage and access. Until recently, no hospitals in Italy were financed and governed from public and 
private sources. However, escalating costs prompted the search for more efficient means of healthcare 
delivery (Jommi et al. 2001). One outcome was the sperimentazione gestionale (“managerial 
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experiment”) that introduced private investment into the public system. This new kind of hospital 
immediately became the subject of controversy (Bonti 1997, Dugato 1998, Fiorentini 2000).  
R-Hospital was converted into a “managerial experiment” in 2004. It acquired the legal status of a 
limited company with 70% of its shares publicly owned and the remainder owned by private investors. 
The governing board comprised two representatives from the private sector and five from the public 
sector. In the senior management team, the CEO, Administrative Director, Marketing Director and their 
staff had business backgrounds, whereas the Clinical Director was a physician. When we entered the 
field in 2010 the hospital had 288 staff of which 80% were medical professionals providing orthopedic 
and neurological rehabilitation services for brain injured patients. Funding was based upon the 
international Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) patient classification system which specifies the 
appropriate fee and period of hospitalization for different services. For the treatment of patients with 
severe brain injuries, R-Hospital received a set daily fee irrespective of the length of hospitalization. 
For other services, however, it received a daily fee for a specified hospitalization period, beyond which 
reimbursement tapered to 50%. R-Hospital’s overall funding thus varied according to the type of 
patients, the extent of bed occupancy, and whether treatment conformed to the DRG system.  
We selected R-Hospital because medicine is a “prototypical profession” (Hughes 1956) where 
physicians enjoy high status in the occupational hierarchy (Scott et al. 2000). Attempts to interfere with 
professional norms in hospital settings are usually strenuously resisted (Ferlie et al. 2005). Hence, R-
Hospital offered a unique research setting because stakeholders considered it an especially effective 
example of a hospital that had combined professional excellence with strong financial outcomes 
achieved through private sector involvement. However, in 2010 an accreditation assessment reported 
deteriorations in some professional standards, and there was a spike in patient complaints. The result 
was growing friction between physicians and administrative staff that became so acute that the hospital 
decided to abandon its multi-logic settlement – and expunge the private logic.  
Data Collection 
Our study centers on a ten-month single-site ethnography (2010-2011) complemented by the collection 
of rich, longitudinal qualitative data (2004-2013). We triangulated three sources of data – non-
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participant observation, interviews, and archival materials – from R-Hospital members and key 
audiences (Table 1). 
----- Table 1 about here ---- 
Non-participant Observation. We collected real time ethnographic data over a period of 10 months 
(2010-2011) for a total of 320 hours of observation. For seven months, we engaged in daily observation 
from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m., followed by one day each week for a further three months. We collected two sets 
of observational data. First, we took part in informal and formal meetings – e.g., board meetings, clinical 
governance meetings, and budget and procurement meetings, as well as all public events organized by 
the hospital (for a total of 46 meetings) – in order to observe how professional, private, and public actors 
related to each other and to their respective audiences. We observed not only what was said, but how it 
was said: we paid close attention to informants’ tone of voice, patterns of speech, facial expressions, 
and body language to understand the meaning and emotions of what was being communicated (Putnam 
et al. 2016). Second, we systematically observed the work of medical professionals. The first author 
attended 20 weekly planning meetings and 20 interdisciplinary team consultations pertaining to the care 
of 140 patients. She acted as a “human camera” (Barley 1990), jotting notes verbatim with the support 
of an observation sheet. The notes were typed within 24 hours (Emerson et al. 1995) and reviewed each 
weekend, forming an Observation Journal of 1,468 pages. These observations were the basis for the 
mapping of the core practices from which we ascertained the relative influence of the three logics, as 
described in the data analysis section. 
Open-ended and Semi-structured Interviews. We conducted a preliminary round of 16 interviews 
at the start of the data collection process in 2010 in which we asked organizational members to describe, 
from their perspective, the key events and decisions that characterized R-Hospital’s formative years so 
that we could properly contextualize our ethnographic data. All of the interviews were recorded and 
transcribed, yielding 480 pages of transcript. Next, guided by the initial weeks of observation, we 
developed an interview protocol to elicit how medical staff at R-Hospital understood and invoked the 
public, private and professional logics in their daily work. We then interviewed 105 organizational 
members (doctors, nurses, care assistants, therapists and administrative staff) during 2010 and 2011. 
Again, the interviews were recorded and transcribed for a total of 2,300 transcript pages. To verify our 
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emerging interpretations, we drew upon multiple informal conversations and unstructured interviews. 
Finally, we conducted ten additional follow up interviews with senior personnel in 2013 and 2015, 
resulting in 300 pages of transcript.  
Archival Materials. We accessed 151 organizational documents covering the lifespan of R-Hospital 
from 2004 onwards. These included clinical professional documents, the minutes of all hospital board 
meetings, all documents related to budget negotiation and procurement activities, and agreements with 
trade unions. To systematically track audience perceptions, we analyzed local and national newspaper 
coverage from 2004 to 2011, yielding 223 articles and several video recordings. Because the source for 
this data was the communication office of R-Hospital, we asked a company specializing in media 
analysis to re-perform the data collection search. The sample was confirmed with a reliability of 90%. 
Furthermore, we collected public speeches, interviews, press releases, and external reports on R-
Hospital by key external stakeholders. We continued to collect archival material after leaving the field. 
Analytical Approach  
We moved iteratively between the data, emerging theory and relevant literature (Miles and Huberman 
1994) following an approach of gradual abstraction that moved from raw data to categories and themes 
(Barley 1990). Our analysis proceeded through four steps.  
Step 1. Identification of the Institutional Logics in R-Hospital. Building upon Reay and Hinings 
(2005) and Thornton et al. (2012), we identified the higher-order institutional systems that characterized 
our context – i.e., the public sector, private sector, and medical profession – and then, based on an in 
vivo coding of our 105 interview transcripts, sought to capture how logics were interpreted “on the 
ground” (Reay and Jones 2016). For each logic we identified its overarching goal, the group of actors 
inside R-Hospital who promoted it, and the corresponding audiences in the institutional environment 
(Pache and Santos 2010).   
The professional logic that we observed in R-Hospital was that of “medical professionalism” (Reay 
and Hinings 2009) where the overarching goal was the provision of medical care deemed appropriate 
for the patient and delivered by qualified professionals. Essential to achieving this goal was the 
physician-patient relationship and the exercise of professional judgment within this relationship. The 
main group who promoted this logic were the medical staff, especially physicians, and its audience-
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level referents were their professional associations. The private logic that we observed was akin to Reay 
and Hinings’ (2009) “business-like healthcare”. Its overarching goal was financial self-sufficiency and 
market share, and a core aim was cost-effective treatment that meets essential patient needs at the lowest 
price. The main group who promoted this logic in our case comprised the CEO, the Administrative and 
Marketing Directors, and the two members of the Board appointed by the private investors. Its audience-
level referents were shareholders and the Association of Private Hospitals. The goals of the public logic 
were similar to those of the professional logic, in that they included the provision of high quality health 
services. However, because the logic’s legitimacy rested upon the political accountability of public 
officials to their electorate, emphasis was upon the overall health system. The main group who promoted 
this logic were board members appointed by the Local Health Unit (LHU), and the local and regional 
government.  
Step 2. The Enactment of Institutional Logics: Practice-level Analysis. Through our interviews we 
identified three practices within R-Hospital (McPherson and Sauder 2013, Smets et al. 2015) that were 
core to the role of physicians: “admission” practices, which centered on the criteria for the admission 
of new patients; “diagnosis and treatment” practices, which concerned the setting up of patients’ 
diagnosis and treatment schedules; and “discharge” practices, which referred to the criteria used to 
conclude the hospitalization of patients and determine post-discharge care. These practices were central 
to the unfolding process that we observed at R-Hospital.  
Implicit in each logic was a set of assumptions about how core hospital practices should be enacted. 
Actors promoting the professional logic believed that it was for physicians to decide whether to 
hospitalize a patient, diagnose appropriate treatment, and determine the time of discharge. Actors 
promoting the private logic emphasized the optimization of income and the need to align all three 
practices with the DRG protocol. Finally, actors promoting the public logic sought to ensure that the 
three practices were implemented on a “first come first served” basis that optimized bed occupancy 
throughout the healthcare system as a whole, rather than only in R-Hospital. 
We triangulated our interviews and observations to understand how physicians enacted the three 
core practices in their everyday work. Mindful that our observational data were limited to the period in 
which the first author was embedded in R-Hospital, we collected additional data that provided a reliable 
  
 
11 
indication of how the three practices had been enacted before our entry to the field. To do so, we 
triangulated archival data on clinical performance with interviews that retrospectively explored the 
enactment of core hospital practices from the introduction of the private logic to the start of our 
fieldwork. Because research participants may downplay ambiguity and conflict when reflecting on the 
past (Kimberly and Bouchikhi 1995), we triangulated the responses of informants from different logics. 
We also engaged with the same informants over time to help build trust (Cardinal et al. 2004).  
For the period in which the first author engaged in daily observations, we coded all of the 
discussions surrounding the decisions made by physicians in their weekly professional meetings with 
respect to the three core practices. Physicians treated 140 patients and took 1,005 decisions pertaining 
to these practices. Seventy-six per cent of the practice-level decisions in our sample (764 of 1,005) were 
routine where physicians confirmed decisions made in previous meetings. By contrast, for 24 per cent 
of the practice-level decisions (241 in total), one of the three logics was explicitly invoked by physicians 
and guided their decisions. It is this subset of 241 practice-level decisions to which we directed our 
attention. In doing so, we assessed which of the decisions were consistent with the professional, public, 
or private logic.  
By analyzing longitudinally the qualitative evidence (i.e., retrospective interview data) and our 
observation of practice-level decisions by physicians in R-Hospital, we were able to examine how the 
relative salience of the three logics changed. Initially, physicians mainly invoked the professional logic 
in their clinical decision making, then they invoked the three logics almost equally, and then they re-
prioritized the professional logic. We centered our analysis on explaining this dynamic. To do so we 
began by examining the organization-level relationships between the actors who promoted each of the 
logics in R-Hospital.    
Step 3. Analysis of the Effects of Audience Feedback on Organizational Relationships. We coded 
excerpts of our field notes, interview transcripts and documents and assigned first order codes that 
meaningfully described the relationships between the three groups at the organization-level by looking, 
for example, for expressions of suspicion, collegiality, and anger, and for the behaviors associated with 
them. Examples of codes were: “private actors portray themselves as supportive of professional goals”, 
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“early benefits are distributed across public, private and professional actors”, and “public, private and 
professional actors increase the interactions with their audience-level referents”. 
At this point in our analysis, we realized that informants promoting each of the logics consistently 
referred to the importance of feedback from external stakeholders. Thus, we turned attention to the 
crucial role of audience evaluations. We triangulated media coverage at local and national levels, as 
well as press releases, public speeches and external reports from key stakeholders, to elicit how the 
various audiences perceived R-Hospital from 2004 onwards. We then interrogated our interviews and 
field notes to better understand how these changes in audience perceptions had affected the hospital’s 
internal workings and organization. Starting from the first order codes, we scrutinized our data to 
capture verbal exchanges that explicitly related the organization-level dynamics (i.e., the behaviors and 
perceptions of the three groups) to feedback from specific audiences. For example, for the code “private 
actors become more assertive”, we analyzed all the passages where the CEO motivated his actions in 
light of the positive feedback received from the Association of Private Clinics; similarly, for the code 
“professional logic prioritized in work practices” we analyzed all of the passages where physicians 
related the change in professional behaviors to the negative evaluation expressed in the hospital’s 
accreditation report.  
Step 4. Elaboration of a Process Model.  We aggregated the basic codes identified in Steps 2 and 3 
into higher order constructs that captured the empirical dynamics in our case. This resulted in eight 
mechanisms spanning three levels of analysis: acclamation and criticism at the audience level (which 
captured stakeholder evaluations); assurance, narrower attention, and logic contestation at the 
organizational level (which captured relationships between those who promoted each logic); and 
incumbents maintain discretion over core practices, incomers undermine incumbents’ discretion over 
core practices, and incumbents reassert discretion over core practices at the practice level (which 
captured the enactment of intra-organizational practices). This allowed us to develop a process multi-
level model that illustrates the relationship between our mechanisms over time and their effects on our 
focal organization. To do so, we “temporally bracketed” (Langley 1999) our analysis into three stages: 
a first stage in which the new logic is effectively introduced and accommodated by organizational actors 
(leading to mutual gains), a second stage in which those promoting the new logic become increasingly 
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assertive (leading to the compromising of standards), and a third stage in which the new logic is rejected 
(leading to restoration of the original hybrid).   
To ensure the trustworthiness of our analysis (Lincoln and Guba 1985) we triangulated across field 
notes, archives and interviews to elicit core constructs. We also conducted internal member checks to 
verify our interpretation of events and collect follow up data. Finally, the two co-authors carefully 
reviewed the fieldnotes in which the first author had recorded her thoughts and feelings throughout the 
data collection period. This combination of the authors’ “insider” and “outsider” perspectives provided 
the benefit of “intimacy” with our research context as well as the opportunity for “distancing” (Langley 
et al. 2013, p. 6).  
Findings 
Our findings unfold over three stages. The first stage is the effective introduction of the private logic 
into R-Hospital, with all actors benefiting from mutual gains. The second stage is the increasing 
assertiveness of the private actors, with strong positive feedback from audiences supporting the private 
logic’s growing influence, but also compromising professional standards. The third stage is the rejection 
of the private logic: criticism of the hospital led to internal conflict and prompted the incumbent actors 
to reassert the primacy of the professional logic, which led to the restoration of the original hybrid 
arrangement. Tables 2a-c summarize the core constructs across the three stages, with additional 
supporting evidence for each one. We consider the stages in turn and emphasize that the core of our 
contribution lies in the interplay of three levels of analysis: evaluations at the audience level, 
relationships between different groups of actors at the organization level, and intra-organizational 
practices at the practice level. 
Effective Introduction Of The Private Logic (2005-2009) 
Audiences were initially skeptical of private involvement in R-Hospital, in part because it had not been 
seen before in Italian healthcare. However, for the first four years R-Hospital seemed to cope well with 
the competing demands of the two incumbent logics and the incoming private logic, and R-Hospital 
established itself as a well-functioning hybrid. We found that this was due to the effective introduction 
of the private logic into R-Hospital by means of two mechanisms: a strategy of assurance by the 
incoming actors at the organization level, and incumbents’ maintenance of discretion over core 
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practices at the practice-level. We first briefly consider the reactions of key audiences to the new hybrid 
arrangement, then examine the two mechanisms. 
----- Table 2a about here ---- 
Audience-level: Skepticism. Audiences did not expect the smooth incorporation of the new logic: 
they initially expressed widespread skepticism that a hospital with private sector involvement could 
thrive in the Italian health system. They also exhibited much ideological resistance. For example, when 
the local government first considered the idea, “the opposition party was against the project. Private 
meant pirates to them.” Ultimately, however, local politicians recognized that if the hospital was to 
avoid closure the managerial experiment “was the only viable solution” (LHU director, interview). 
Even so, many stakeholders had doubts about whether R-Hospital was an appropriate place to start, as 
evidenced by the low interest shown by private investors: “When the LHU issued the public tender for 
the selection of the private partner in 2003, only 3 private companies applied and by the end of the 
procedure we were the only one left” (private investor #1, interview). Parts of the Italian medical 
establishment also questioned the choice of R-Hospital, noting its geographical and professional 
isolation, and pointed to its modest clinical reputation: “R-Hospital was a peripheral facility, most of 
the physicians were at the end of their careers and no one sought to replace them, it was not an attractive 
place” (LHU physician #1, interview).  
Organizational-level: Assurance. When the private actors first entered R-Hospital they careful 
signaled that they did not pose a threat to incumbents – that their intentions were solely to support 
healthcare delivery. This was a deliberate strategy on their part designed to smooth relationships with, 
and overcome resistance from, the professional and public actors. We were informed in the early months 
of our fieldwork that the incoming private actors – notably, the CEO, Administrative Director and 
Marketing Director – had been aware of the need to gain acceptance and thus had openly portrayed 
themselves as supportive of the current professional and public goals of the hospital. They stressed that 
their efforts would be focused on supporting clinical performance and patient welfare – financial 
considerations would be secondary. As the CEO recalled: “When I arrived in R-Hospital it was just me 
and many skeptical and demotivated clinicians…I met with a few clinicians that I thought had the 
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potential to lead the professional transition and asked them ‘what do you need? I am here to support.’ 
This is how we started to calibrate in a gradual way” (CEO, interview). 
Consistent with this stance, the actors promoting the private logic were careful to discuss their ideas 
with their professional and public counterparts before making efforts to implement them. Further, they 
consulted the Clinical Director on all decisions that had any clinical implications. This judicious 
entrance was evident in the stories told to us about life during this early period:  
I remember that in his first year the CEO invited physicians of the Italian Association of Private Health 
Clinics to teach us about their use of business practices, such as the DRG protocol. It was not the CEO 
who taught us directly, but someone from our profession. This was a smart move because we perceived 
them as being legitimate” (Clinical Director, interview). 
Moreover, the private actors emphasized that the LHU was the “leading shareholder and the key 
organ of control of R-Hospital” (private investor, press release #6), and would form a safety net against 
any over-zealousness on the part of investors and managers who might be tempted to take cost cutting 
measures too far. They also repeatedly stated that the commercial principles they espoused were 
designed to help physicians deliver high quality care. The CEO was quoted in the provincial newspaper 
(2005) as saying: 
I believe that the hospital can work properly only if it is supported by two key stakeholders: the city 
public hospital and the community of general practitioners…Healthcare is public and it would be 
ridiculous to think that private actors could substitute for the State. The role of the private actor is to 
guarantee professional services in a better and more efficient way (CEO, quoted in the provincial 
newspaper #1). 
 
Later, he repeated the point: “When I arrived in 2004 I set out to portray the relationship with 
physicians not as contrasting but as collaboration. I gradually established a relationship of trust with the 
existing professionals working in the hospital and…with the local health unit” (CEO, interview). This 
approach was confirmed by an interview with a key actor promoting the public logic – the former 
director of the LHU – who commented that: “The private actors came to R-Hospital with no 
expectations of taking over the lead of the hospital.” 
Practice-level: Incumbents Maintain Discretion Over Core Practices. The private actors were 
careful not to place pressure on physicians with respect to their enactment of core hospital practices. 
While they suggested changes, which were frequently adopted by physicians and which resulted in the 
incremental integration of the private logic into core hospital practices, these suggestions were 
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intentionally positioned in a way that did not impinge upon physicians’ discretion over admissions, 
diagnosis and treatment, and discharge. Rather, the private actors presented alternative ways by which 
these practices could be enacted and sought to persuade physicians to consider them. For physicians, 
this respect for their professional discretion was of profound importance and was significant in allaying 
their skepticism, even as they incorporated ideas from the private logic into their decision-making: 
“Being left alone in our work, this is what mattered to us” (physician #2, informal exchange). Evidence 
from archival and retrospective interview data supports this statement.  
In terms of admissions, although the influence of the private logic was evident, physicians explicitly 
based their decisions upon professional judgment. For example, senior physicians acknowledged the 
private actors’ request to maximize bed occupancy in order to support the hospital’s financial 
sustainability, and searched for new ways to increase the number of admissions, such as by promoting 
the hospital in the local area and incentivizing colleagues to refer patients to R-Hospital. Yet, in the first 
four years the hospital did not operate at its full capacity (it increased to 100% of capacity only in Stage 
2). Also, while the private actors encouraged physicians to admit more remunerative patients, they did 
not place pressure on them to do so and the numbers were relatively small throughout this stage. As one 
physician put it, “in the first few years we had freedom to select the cases to be inserted in the waiting 
list for admission” (physician #4, interview). The prioritization of professional criteria in admission 
practices was also confirmed by private actors: “In the early days we did not interfere with the selection 
of patients entering the ward; we were busy in setting up all the administrative procedures and business 
relations” (CEO, interview).  
Physicians exercised the same leeway for diagnosis and treatment. All physicians interviewed 
confirmed that they had exercised full discretion over patient care: “This was the time in which we 
experimented with many new rehabilitation techniques, some of which worked, some others did not” 
(physician #2, interview). The CEO also remembered “being very cautious in imposing any strict rule 
on how the physicians should operate in their daily work… [this] was a delicate moment: entering an 
existing organization and being viewed with high suspicion did not facilitate our early acceptance” 
(CEO, interview). 
  
 
17 
In terms of the discharge practice, physicians agreed to the introduction of the DRG system – the 
core idea advocated by those promoting the private logic in R-Hospital – which had significant 
implications for hospital income. However, during Stage 1 the physicians “found no major obstacles in 
discharge when the rehabilitation path was terminated” (physician #3, interview). Indeed, while private 
actors were clearly keen to integrate the DRG system in R-Hospital’s practices, they opted for “a 
bottom-up implementation, involving physicians and nurses in its early implementation” 
(Administrative Director, interview). 
Thus, overall, we found that during Stage 1 physicians maintained control over the extent to which 
the private logic influenced core hospital practices. In other words, although the private actors promoted 
the private logic, and the private logic was incorporated into core practices, this happened incrementally 
– and, critically, at the discretion of the physicians. The professional logic remained dominant.  
Outcome: Mutual Gains. The private actors’ strategy of assurance, combined with their respect for 
the discretion of physicians over core practices, enabled the achievement of financial and clinical gains 
that tempered the concerns of physicians and indeed the public actors. Financially, the turnover of the 
hospital increased by 74% in 2005, 31% in 2006, 15% in 2007, 9% in 2008 and 16% in 2009. Gross 
operating margins were also positive – 6% in 2006, 18% in 2007, 17% in 2008, and 16% in 2009. To 
support clinical performance, the senior management team used annual net profits for the purchase of 
advanced equipment (annual reports, 2005-2009), the renovation of the wards (annual report, 2008), 
and the training of nurses, care assistants and physicians (annual reports, 2005-2009). While each gain, 
in itself, did not radically alter the performance of the hospital, collectively they represented a 
cumulative step change, both clinically and financially. Moreover, these gains resonated throughout R-
Hospital: all occupational groups felt advantaged by them, both materially (through new equipment and 
training) and symbolically (through the hospital’s strengthening reputation).  
The upshot was a growing enthusiasm for the hospital. The private actors had overcome the 
reservations of the medical staff, and collegial relationships between medical and non-medical 
personnel were apparent in formal settings (e.g., board meetings) and informally on the wards. The 
Clinical Director, who had 30 years of experience in publicly funded healthcare, declared: “We are now 
all perfectly integrated”. And, with a smile on his face, captured the sense of collegiality by saying: 
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“We strategize all together while eating a sandwich”. One nurse nostalgically recalled: “we felt it was 
our hospital, our home. What do you do with your home? You give the maximum level of care” (nurse 
#11, interview).  
Increasing Assertiveness Of The Private Logic (2009-2010) 
On the surface, R-Hospital appeared to be moving from strength to strength and was widely praised by 
key stakeholders, but internally R-Hospital became volatile. Specifically, audiences’ widespread 
positive acceptance of R-Hospital turned to acclamation. Whilst this audience-level mechanism 
intensified the commitment of those within the hospital to sustain performance, it also precipitated, and 
then exacerbated, two mechanisms that destabilized the workings of the hybrid. First, at the 
organizational-level, narrower attention became evident as actors promoting different logics built 
relationships with particular audiences, but showed less interest in the views of others. Second, buoyed 
by their role in R-Hospital’s apparent turnaround, incoming actors undermined incumbents’ discretion 
over core practices by pressing for their ideas to be adopted much more extensively in clinical decision 
making. At the same time, the public actors increasingly aligned themselves with the private actors 
while also pushing their own interests. In other words, the private and the public actors came together 
to challenge the primacy of the professional logic in the functioning of the hospital. 
----- Table 2b about here ---- 
Audience-level: Acclamation. By 2009, a range of audiences recognized R-Hospital as a highly 
specialized provider of rehabilitation services. The change in status was reflected in a shift in the type 
of patients referred to it – the hospital treated relatively fewer orthopedic patients and focused instead 
on more challenging cases. The number of post-anoxia and neurological patients, for example, increased 
from 8 in 2004 to 120 in 2009 (official statistics R-Hospital). The media applauded these achievements. 
One newspaper referred to R-Hospital as “the optimal organizational model for delivering rehabilitation 
services”, highlighting that it could “maximize the synergies between the public and the private 
spheres” (provincial newspaper #4).  
Physicians who had originally felt that working in R-Hospital would be less attractive than working 
in a city hospital now believed that the wider professional community respected them as highly 
competent and as playing a valuable role in Italian healthcare. That respect was reflected in invitations 
  
 
19 
to a senior physician to join the editorial board of an important academic journal, and for the Clinical 
Director to join the national committee on clinical rehabilitation practice. It was also reflected in a 
research agreement signed with an elite university. Further, more and more physicians from R-Hospital 
began attending regional and then national conferences, prompting the Clinical Director to proudly 
point out that “in the past three years we have moved from having no external engagements with the 
scientific community to having almost all physicians submitting abstracts to the national conference on 
rehabilitation”. Indeed, during 2009-10 nearly 60 per cent of physicians participated in national 
conferences, notably the Italian Society of Orthopaedic Rehabilitation Conference.  
R-Hospital became an attractive employment option. Whereas many of the senior doctors had 
applied to the hospital because of the “lack of job market alternatives” (physician #3, interview) or for 
family reasons – “I knew they had recently opened a new hospital close to home and wanted to stay 
nearby” (physician #1, interview) – many junior doctors hired in 2008-09 applied because of the career 
opportunities R-Hospital afforded. A junior physician reinforced this view: “I applied to R-Hospital 
because I thought it could give me the best professional training” (physician #12, interview).  
It was not only members of the medical staff who were feted by the wider community. The CEO 
was invited to give a keynote speech at a national meeting of the Association of Private Health Clinics 
and was a guest speaker at a leading national business school. He also advised on how R-Hospital could 
be written up as a case study for graduate management courses. Executive directors of foreign hospitals 
and members of consulting companies visited in order to learn from the CEO how to make a public-
private partnership work. Those promoting the public logic also benefited from the hospital’s 
performance. In 2009 the Secretary General of the regional government declared R-Hospital to be “a 
model to be exported, as confirmed not only by the economic results, but also by the high level of 
customer satisfaction” (press release #34). For them, customer satisfaction was expected to translate 
into electoral support.  
Thus R-Hospital was widely celebrated, with members of each of its constituent groups feted by 
audiences of their logic.  
Organization-level: Narrower Attention. Acclamation had important effects upon the relationships 
between R-Hospital and its key audiences. Physicians’ interactions with their professional community 
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were bolstered significantly by the increased conference attendance and recognition discussed earlier. 
Private logic proponents also appreciated the attention and respect that they received. For them, 
however, the “reference community is the Association of Private Clinics” (CEO, interview). The CEO 
and his colleagues – notably the Directors of Administration and of Marketing – expressed pride in the 
growing flow of visitors from foreign hospitals and consulting firms: “Next week we will host a 
delegation of hospital CEOs from Eastern Europe. This is a great achievement, we are honoured and 
delighted to be the only hospital they will visit in our Region” (Marketing Director, informal exchange). 
Advocates of the public logic also had their own key audiences – the electorate and politicians. For 
these audiences, R-Hospital was taking pressure off the public healthcare system by enabling more 
patients to receive timely care without the need for any additional public funding. As one Local Health 
Unit Board member proudly recalled during a board meeting: “I talked to a group of citizens living in 
the city. All of them confirmed that they prefer driving 40 minutes to R-Hospital rather than going to 
the city hospital”.  
An implication of these interactions between the three groups and their respective audiences was 
narrower attention on the part of all them. Proponents of each logic developed attachments to audiences 
whose attention and positive reinforcement they valued. At the same time, they showed limited concern 
about feedback from ‘other’ audiences – what mattered was validation from ‘their’ peers. This was 
indicated in various ways, not least the relative ignorance of the others’ activities and accomplishments. 
For example, when the CEO gave a keynote speech at the Association of Private Clinics, none of the 
physicians – including the Clinical Director – was aware of it. Physicians were also surprised when 
foreign hospital administrators visited their wards.  
This narrower focus of attention would later prove to be a destabilizing force, but in the short term 
it boosted morale. We observed few complaints about work pressures. On the contrary, the following 
enthusiastic comment was more typical: “It is such a rewarding experience to be working here” 
(physician #8, interview). Advocates of the three logics also began to form their own separate informal 
groups for lunch (to which the first author was invited) and would meet for evening drinks and meals 
to celebrate with pride and optimism how things were progressing. This had not happened in the past. 
During a physicians’ dinner, one admitted “I do not feel the distinction between ‘work life’ and ‘private 
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life’ with my colleagues. For example tonight we are just hanging out together to celebrate the arrival 
of a new colleague.” 
Actors’ narrower attention began to change the internal dynamics of the hospital. Crucially, 
incomers promoting the private logic became much more confident and assertive. They believed that 
the seemingly impressive clinical and financial performance of R-Hospital could be attributed to the 
ideas and practices that they had introduced. As the Administrative Director said to us in an informal 
exchange: “It is only thanks to our managerial skills that R-Hospital is the center of excellence widely 
recognized today.” This led to a shift in relationships between the three groups. The private actors began 
to attract support from those promoting the public logic who, after overcoming their initial skepticism, 
openly gave credit to their private sector colleagues: 
The competitive advantage of R-Hospital, I mean the reason for its success, is that it is always, always, 
always able to ensure a bed or a timely outpatient visit when needed. And this is because the private 
management has rendered it more efficient. I am not saying something which contradicts my role as a 
public representative, I always say what I think is the truth (LHU rep #1, Board meeting #2). 
In effect, the public actors increasingly perceived the purposes and values of the public logic as 
aligned with those of the private logic, and began to reconsider their previously taken-for-granted close 
association with the professional logic. 
Practice-level: Incoming Actors Undermine Incumbents’ Discretion Over Core Practices. A critical 
consequence of the assertive stance of the private actors, and of the changing relationships between 
different groups, was increased pressure on physicians to comply with prescriptions of the private logic. 
Proponents of the private logic began to emphasize the need to fill beds, the importance of strict 
adherence to the DRG protocol, and the benefits of bed occupancy by patients for whom the hospital 
received the highest reimbursement. In consequence, physicians were much more influenced than 
previously by the private logic in their admissions and discharge practices – and even, although to a 
more modest extent, in their treatment practices. All of these changes were designed to contribute to 
the optimization of revenues. But, crucially, in doing so they encroached upon the discretion of the 
physicians, who perceived the need to conform. These encroachments by the private actors were very 
deliberate: 
  
 
22 
I am now assuming a more restrictive behavior, which means that the Clinical Director cannot authorize 
any type of costs without the approval of the Administrative Directorate. Everything must be seen and 
pass through this office (Administrative Director, interview). 
 
Concurrently, the public actors increasingly appreciated that R-Hospital’s efficiency was 
contributing to the wider healthcare system by “processing” patients in a cost and time efficient manner, 
such that resources could be reallocated elsewhere. As a result, the LHU also sought to influence 
physicians’ enactment of core practices, requesting R-Hospital to admit patients with lower 
rehabilitation potential in order to free up resources for other hospitals. Further, because hospitals in the 
region were having difficulty handling the growing flow of patients discharged from R-Hospital, the 
LHU gave R-Hospital responsibility for post-discharge care. As the Director of the LHU explained 
during an interview:  
This hospital is like our young kid who’s now growing up. During his first years of life, we left him 
free to experiment with the new reality. But now we cannot have children walking at different paces. I 
mean, it would be extremely hard to justify why this hospital makes a profit, while the LHU as a whole 
is in deficit. The hospital must help the other public facilities, as elder brothers would do (LHU director, 
interview). 
 
The increased influence of the private and public logics resulted in more demands being placed on 
physicians – particularly with respect to the optimization of bed occupancy and the admission of patients 
for whom the hospital would receive the highest reimbursement. One might have expected physicians 
to push back against such pressures, but in Stage 2 they did not generate dissent. A key question is why?  
Our analysis suggests that audience-level acclamation had raised performance expectations and that 
physicians were proud of the hospital’s growing reputation, which outweighed potential concerns. We 
observed this pride in several conversations between physicians. As one said, “we are committed to this 
hospital and we want to perform better and better.” At another meeting a physician explicitly 
commented upon the importance of maximizing bed occupancy: 
Have you read the newspaper article published yesterday? They point out how during the summer 
period hospitals work on average at 50% of their capacity. On the contrary, they emphasize that our 
hospital is always operative and work at 100% of its capacity. We should be proud of this. Make sure 
we continue keeping 100% of our beds full throughout the year (physician #7, informal conversation). 
We also found evidence of physicians justifying pressures arising from the public logic. After the 
public actors gave physicians responsibility for arranging patients’ post-discharge care, one of them 
said: 
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On Monday I took part in a professional seminar with the most important physicians of the area. A 
colleague of ours, working in Hospice B (a post-discharge setting), openly said in front of all our 
colleagues that he strongly recommended our hospital because all the patients discharged by us and 
then admitted in Hospice B were happy of the service received. In their view, in no other hospital could 
they find physicians taking care so intensively of the post-discharge setting of patients. This is a source 
of advantage for us (physician #4, informal conversation). 
Physicians had internalized the narrative that the ideas associated with the private logic underpinned 
the hospital’s “remarkable” turnaround and its burgeoning national profile – a narrative that was 
exploited by those promoting the private and public logics, and that increased the workload of 
physicians. Thus, to cope with their increasing work pressures, physicians reinterpreted professional 
protocols and extended the application of private logic, as well as the public logic, more deeply into the 
three core practices. Whereas in Stage 1 physicians’ decisions with respect to admissions, diagnosis and 
treatment, and discharge were governed primarily according to the professional logic, in Stage 2 the 
influence of the logics was more balanced. As shown in Table 2b, of the 138 decisions analyzed during 
Stage 2, physicians involved the professional logic in 31% of cases, the private logic in 37% of cases, 
and the public logic in 32% of cases.  
More specifically, in their decisions on admissions, physicians selected patients with the greatest 
reimbursement potential in 38% of cases, a decision consistent with the private but not the professional 
logic, which emphasized patients’ rehabilitation potential. This prioritization of the private logic is also 
illustrated in an exchange between two physicians who moved patients to the top of the list for 
admissions without regard for their rehabilitation potential: 
Physician #2: (talking about the waiting list) How many cod.3 patients (i.e., highest earning category) 
do we have at the moment? 
Physician #6: 26 
Physician #2: We must increase the number of patients. Let’s put 2 of these patients on the top of the 
admission list of next week (weekly meeting #4, observation). 
Similarly, in 32% of cases physicians gave priority to patients coming from the local area – again, 
irrespective of the patients’ rehabilitation potential – thus giving priority to the public logic. When a 
physician asked which of two patients should be admitted – “Patient A has a higher rehabilitation 
potential; Patient B definitely has lower potential, but she comes from the nearby hospital” – he was 
told: “take patient B first. Once we saturate the demand from local patients we can admit Patient A.” In 
  
 
24 
contrast to Stage 1 when the professional logic was dominant, in Stage 2 in only 30% of cases did 
physicians invoke the professional logic and give priority to patients with higher rehabilitation potential.  
In terms of diagnosis and treatment, a similar pattern can be observed, albeit in a less extreme form. 
Physicians prioritized the professional logic in less than half of the cases (44%). For example, 
physicians frequently made assertions such as: “We should try to reduce the number of extra diagnostic 
examinations, unless strictly necessary” (physician #12). It was evident from the context of this 
particular statement that a treatment decision was being adjusted because of a perceived pressure to 
reduce costs – i.e., the private logic was overriding the professional logic. We observed other instances 
where the influence of the private actors was similarly brought to bear in clinical decision making, 
including the limiting of diagnostic examinations in order to reduce the costs of drugs. 
Finally, with regard to the practice of discharge, physicians invoked the professional logic in only 
27% of cases as compared to 41% of the cases where physicians complied with the private-logic 
emphasis upon the DRG protocol in order to capture full reimbursement, thereby maximizing revenues. 
The reasoning behind such decisions was revealed in an exchange during a planning meeting: 
Physician #11: The length of hospitalization of Patient 38, according to his DRG, is 28 days. This means 
next week. We could potentially still work with him, but this would require exceeding the time limit. 
What shall I do? 
Physician #5: I suggest keeping to the length of hospitalization set by the DRG. You can then write in 
the discharge letter that extra rehabilitation exercises are needed for a full recovery. 
Physician #11: Ok, let’s keep the time limit (weekly meeting #5, observation). 
 
In a further 32% of cases, physicians’ decisions to discharge were explicitly influenced by pressure 
from the public logic to delay discharges until arrangements for post-discharge care were in place, even 
though treatment had been completed. As an example, consider the following exchange between 
physicians:  
Physician #8: Patient 43 has completed his rehabilitation project. The public hospice that will host him 
is full and has asked us to wait an extra week. 
Physician #6: Let’s wait for the availability of the public hospice then. We’ll keep the bed occupied and 
show that we take care of the post-discharge setting.  
Physician #8: I agree (weekly meeting #4, observation). 
 
Outcome: Standards Compromised. By mid-2010 it was clear that, even though physicians were 
experiencing increasing work pressures, they largely accommodated the new arrangements. This was 
because, as we showed earlier, they were proud of R-Hospital’s growing reputation – which reflected 
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positively upon their own professional reputations – and they believed that meeting the expectations 
associated with the private logic would help sustain it. However, as illustrated by our practice-level 
analysis, the increasing influence of the private logic, and indeed the public logic, led ultimately to a 
compromise of professional standards. Patients were being hospitalized for up to 20% longer than 
previously and physicians had become 50% less effective in achieving the rehabilitation goals defined 
by the Barthel Index, an internationally used scale that measures a person’s ability to accomplish 
everyday tasks such as eating, dressing, and washing.  
Rejection Of The Private Logic (2011-2013) 
In 2011 there was a dramatic turn of events. For the first time, audiences subjected R-Hospital to 
criticism because of shortfalls in its clinical performance and standards of patient care, criticism that 
the physicians in particular – and to a lesser extent the public actors, but not the private actors – 
perceived as reflecting badly on their conduct. This precipitated two mechanisms. First, logic 
contestation became widespread. Second, incumbents reasserted their discretion over core practices – 
physicians reappraised how they conducted admissions, diagnosis and treatment, and discharge and, 
with the support of the public actors, abruptly reaffirmed the primacy of the professional logic. The 
result was the expulsion of the private logic and the restoration of the original hybrid.  
----- Table 2c about here ---- 
Audience-level: Criticism. In early 2011, an externally conducted quality accreditation of R-
Hospital highlighted in a visible way the outcomes of Stage 2 referred to above. While much of the 
report was positive, the report clearly indicated instances where professional standards had been 
compromised. Physicians also learned of an increasing number of complaints from patients and their 
families. During our fieldwork, we observed for the first time patients expressing dissatisfaction to 
medical staff about “the time dedicated by the physicians to their patients” and the “quality of care 
provided by nurses and care assistants”. One patient commented angrily that “it is more a production 
chain than a hospital” (ward observations #34-36). While the absolute number of patient complaints 
was relatively small, when coupled with the accreditation report, the complaints drew the attention of 
physicians and magnified their impact.  
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At first, the criticisms surprised physicians – they appeared taken aback by them. The accreditation 
report was the first negative evaluation that the hospital had received since the early days of R-Hospital, 
and we did not find evidence, either from our interviews or our observations, to suggest that physicians 
had concerns about clinical performance. However, it quickly became apparent that physicians 
interpreted this negative feedback as threatening the respect they had gained from the audiences they 
most valued: as a consequence of participation in local and national conferences, they had become 
sensitive to even modest feedback that questioned their professional competence. Their immediate 
response to the accreditation report and the complaints from patients was to blame the pressures of 
work. As one put it: “It is hard to sustain these frenetic working standards and patients’ relatives now 
complain that we care more about quantity than quality” (physician #9, informal exchange). Another 
lamented that: “Patient #74 has a decubitus ulcer and is complaining about the way he is treated by the 
nurses. I know that our nurses have less time per patient now; it wasn’t like this in the past” (physician 
#6, informal exchange). Expressing dismay and with a clear tone of anger, another physician 
commented: “This morning I intercepted a phone call of patient #120’s relatives. They wanted to talk 
to the external relations office to complain about the quality of care provided” (physician #8, informal 
exchange). In addition, senior physicians increasingly voiced concern that their staff was demotivated: 
“I do not know how to motivate my team. It is so disappointing” (physician #7). 
Organization-level: Logic Contestation. In the weeks immediately following publication of the 
accreditation report, physicians’ discontent became ever more evident. A key moment happened when 
the Clinical Director suggested in an emotional meeting that it was pressures from “bureaucrats” that 
had led to the poor patient outcomes: 
These data are drawn from the accreditation process. Now that the process has come to an end, we 
should make a decision: either file it as any other bureaucratic activity we carried out in the past or use 
it as a way to improve our work. I suggest we go for the latter and collect indicators both on the clinical 
and on the organizational side (Clinical Director, weekly meeting #11. Italics indicate raised voice). 
Senior clinicians followed suit, placing the blame squarely on the private actors. Increasingly, the 
physicians – regardless of seniority or length of service – began to attribute the compromising of 
standards and the rise in patient complaints to the business-like practices now portrayed as “imposed” 
upon them. Physicians became visibly upset in their weekly meetings and began criticizing the private 
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actors, referring to them as “interfering” and of “undermining” clinical work. They punctuated these 
meetings with statements such as “We are the one doing the ‘job’ here…Without us this hospital would 
close tomorrow” (italics indicate a raised voice). Moreover, they dismissively referred to non-medical 
managerial staff – whom they accused of claiming undue credit for the hospital’s past clinical 
achievements – as “them”. According to one physician, “I am so frustrated. I mean, treating 1 of 100 
type-3 patients does not make a difference to them [pointing to the administrative team dining in the 
hall]… I need to get gratification from the activities I carry out. I should be able to start and conclude a 
rehab path…” (physician #11, lunch conversation between physicians). 
At the same time, physicians insisted on greater involvement in important organizational decisions. 
In one notable meeting, the Clinical Director confronted the Administrative Director, announcing that 
any requests for increases in productivity would henceforth be rejected unless accompanied by 
additional resources. In the hospital wards, professionals became more forceful and excluded private 
actors from their daily activities. For their part, promoters of the public logic had also lost confidence 
in the private logic and in a highly symbolic move the CEO was forbidden to lobby regional politicians. 
Members of the LHU insisted that it was they, and they alone, who could do so. The implication was 
clear: the decline in professional standards was the fault of those advocating the private logic; ‘they’ 
were to blame. Hence, both the physicians and public actors started to withdraw their support from the 
private actors and to push for a return to the original prioritization of logics in R-Hospital – the 
previously close relationship between the professional and public logics came to be re-established. 
Nevertheless, the private actors persisted in pushing for greater efficiency and complained about 
the inability of physicians to meet targets. They continued to promote the application of their logic as 
the appropriate way forward and seemed immune to the criticisms contained in the accreditation report. 
Crucially, their audience-level referents still applauded their efforts: visits from CEOs of foreign 
hospitals continued, the Association of Private Health Clinics still referred to R-Hospital as 
exemplifying best practice in the management of hospitals, and the CEO kept on being invited to 
roundtables on how to successfully manage public-private partnerships. As a result, the private actors 
sought to push their approach even further in response to this positive feedback. In frustration at the 
physicians’ sudden resistance to their initiatives, they reallocated resources from services that generated 
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limited income (e.g., speech therapy) to those that increased hospital revenues (e.g., ambulatory 
services). In doing so, they neither informed the Clinical Director nor asked for his views, contrary to 
their previous behaviors. This proved counterproductive politically. Worsening relations between the 
private actors and the physicians, as well as the private and the public actors, became evident in the 
caustic interactions between the groups. Informal and social events – such as joint coffee breaks and 
the Christmas party – simply ceased. 
     Practice-level: Incumbents Reassert Discretion Over Core Practices. Our practice-level analysis 
shows that physicians not only reasserted themselves in organizational decision-making, they also took 
back control of core hospital practices. Senior clinicians insisted that any pressures that could 
compromise standards of care should be resisted. As shown in Table 2c, of the 101 decisions analyzed 
during Stage 3, physicians invoked the professional logic in 85% of cases, the private logic in only 7% 
of cases, and the public logic in 8% of cases.  
     Considering each practice in turn, we found that physicians based 85% of admissions decisions on 
the professional logic (up sharply from 31% in Stage 2). The Clinical Director declared firmly that:  
From now onwards, we should select patients more carefully on the basis of their rehabilitation. We 
should try not to hospitalize patients in vegetative states, even though we might have pressure to do so. 
Be sure that patients have some type of rehabilitation potential” (weekly meeting #11, italics indicate 
raised voice). 
 
     In terms of diagnosis and treatment, in 83% of cases (up from 44% in Stage 2), physicians followed 
the professional logic, prioritizing patient care without regard for financial or capacity implications. For 
example, unlike in Stage 2 when physicians had routinely complied with pressure from the private 
actors to limit patient referrals to other medical facilities, in Stage 3 physicians frequently sent patients 
to other medical facilities for tests despite the costs of doing so.  
     Finally, with regard to discharge, physicians followed the professional logic in 87% of cases (up 
from 37% in Stage 2). Indeed, the Clinical Director explicitly insisted upon the application of the 
professional logic in discharge decisions:  
You have frequently heard that patients ‘expire’ as if they were a type of mozzarella cheese. Well, this 
is not true. It simply means that there is a tariff reduction, but we are not forced to discharge them. We 
do that because we deem it clinically appropriate to complete the rehabilitation project in this time span” 
(weekly meeting # 11). 
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     As a result, the proportion of orthopedic patients discharged within the strict time limits prescribed 
by the DRG system dropped from 41% to 6%, significantly curtailing hospital revenues. Moreover, 
physicians resisted taking responsibility for post-discharge care (they did so in just 8% of cases, down 
from 32% in Stage 2) as advocated by the public logic, because it distracted them from looking after 
patients: 
It is true that those patients we helped find a post-discharge setting for recommended our service. Yet, 
in reality they are not glorifying our professional skills in terms of our ability to cure them. Rather, they 
appreciate our…ability to find them a place to stay once they move out from our hospital. But this is 
not our duty: from now onwards we should not spend too much time in dealing with non-professional 
tasks (physician #4, weekly meeting #13).  
Outcome: Restoration of the Original Hybrid. In March 2011 frictions reached a head when the 
CEO and the Administrative Director announced that R-Hospital would be restructured into two 
subunits: inpatient services provided under a public payment scheme; and outpatient services monitored 
against commercial targets. Again, this decision was taken without the Clinical Director’s involvement. 
The new structure, however, proved unworkable. After only two more years the CEO resigned, followed 
a year later by the Administrative Director. The regional government formally announced that this 
particular managerial experiment was to be abandoned. The LHU bought back all privately owned 
shares and the hospital became the publicly funded hub of the region’s rehabilitation services. In other 
words, the private logic was rejected. The multi-logic experiment had proved unsustainable and was 
replaced with a traditional public-professional hybrid. 
Alternative Explanations 
Through our analysis, we offer an account of how a new logic can be accepted into an established 
organization to create a well-functioning hybrid arrangement, and how the arrangement can break down 
– with the incoming logic expelled and the original hybrid restored. At the core of our account is the 
role of audience feedback, which has specific effects on relationships between organizational members 
and the enactment of core practices. At the same time, and while we have confidence in our analysis, it 
is important that we interrogate alternative explanations for the events that unfolded in our focal case.  
First, it could be that the incoming private logic was never accepted in R-Hospital – that incumbent 
actors decoupled by appearing to adopt the prescriptions of the private logic, but did so only on the 
surface, which is why no tensions were evident in Stage 1. This explanation would suggest that the 
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meaningful adoption of the private logic did not happen until Stage 2 – the collapse of the hybrid 
stemming from the conflicting pressures that arose when the private logic came into direct contact with 
the professional and public logics. However, the evidence does not support this account in our case. 
Specifically, our data show clearly that the physicians enthusiastically adopted a number of ideas from 
the private logic in Stage 1, most notably the DRG system, and that such ideas substantively affected 
physicians’ enactment of core practices at R-Hospital in its early years.  
Second, it could be argued that our case can be explained much more simply in terms of diminishing 
returns. From this perspective, the introduction of a new logic provided the impetus to rethink ways of 
working in the hospital, which precipitated changes that increased organizational performance. Over 
time, however, after the straightforward changes had been made, the benefits of implementing the new 
logic declined, leading the public and professional actors to become frustrated, thereby creating tensions 
between the different groups which ultimately destabilized the hospital. Again, the evidence indicates 
that this explanation does not apply in our case: our data shows that the issues which led ultimately to 
the collapse of the hybrid arrangement were rooted in negative external audience feedback rather than 
a perception amongst organizational members that the private logic had become less effective.  
A third alternative explanation is that as the performance of R-Hospital improved, audience 
expectations moved ever higher, creating a destabilizing dynamic. This account would suggest that 
audience criticism of R-Hospital was not based on any objective measure of performance, but stemmed 
from audiences progressively raising the bar with respect to their conception of outstanding 
performance. This dynamic may have been evident to an extent in our case: our data show that, over 
time, audiences stopped being surprised at R-Hospital’s apparent accomplishments. However, the 
physicians were very clear – both in their comments to us and their interactions with one another during 
Stage 3 – that clinical standards had deteriorated, and so we do not believe that this explanation 
adequately accounts for what happened in our case. 
Discussion 
Our findings support three contributions. First, and most importantly, we present a model of a 
previously neglected process, which allows us to explain the puzzle of how a new logic can be accepted 
then rejected in hybrid organizations. Second, we deepen our understanding of the challenges of hybrid 
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organizing by showing the critical importance of the interaction between the audience, organization, 
and practice levels. Finally, we connect to the broader institutional literature by challenging two of its 
widely held assumptions.   
A Process Model Of Logic Acceptance And Rejection In Hybrid Organizations 
The case of R-Hospital features a mature hybrid organization that introduced a new logic in a seemingly 
effective manner – despite that logic initially being viewed with considerable skepticism. But then 
suddenly, and with minimal warning, the hospital became riven with infighting, leading to the collapse 
of the revised hybrid arrangements. Drawing on our findings, in this section we elaborate the 
overarching process (see Figure 1). Our model comprises three discrete stages and cuts across the 
audience, organization and practice levels of analysis. 
------ Figure 1 about here ------ 
The first stage in our model is the effective introduction of a new logic. A key task facing actors 
promoting this new logic is overcoming the skepticism of key audiences as well as resistance from 
incumbent organizational actors, especially if the logic is viewed as alien or even dangerous (see also 
Hardy and Maguire 2017, Selznick 1996). Note that audience skepticism is not a mechanism in our 
model, but represents a common scenario when novel hybrid arrangements emerge (Tracey et al. 2011). 
Our model presumes that incoming actors promoting the new logic recognize that, in order to gain 
acceptance from incumbents, it is strategically advantageous to present the new logic as an opportunity 
to further organizational priorities. Hence, they adopt a strategy of assurance by emphasizing that the 
primacy of incumbent logics will not be affected, thus signaling that the incoming logic is not a threat; 
on the contrary, the new logic is portrayed as a means to advance existing organizational goals. 
Moreover, to make this entry strategy work, incomers are careful to ensure that incumbents maintain 
discretion over core practices. In other words, incomers make the new logic available, but do not insist 
upon its implementation in core organizational decision making – they persuade incumbents to adopt it 
rather than mandate its use. 
Taken together, these mechanisms indicate that at the heart of an effective entry strategy for an 
incoming logic perceived as hostile by incumbents, is a portrayal of “deference” – a strategic behavior 
designed to nurture relationships with others who are reluctant to engage (Jourdan et al. 2017). 
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Deference encourages incumbent actors to favorably appraise an incoming logic despite their initial 
fears. An important outcome of this strategy in our case was the achievement of mutual gains stemming 
from notable performance improvements that signaled that the new multi-logic settlement was working. 
These improvements energized incumbents and captured the attention of external audiences, providing 
the impetus for the transition to Stage 2.  
The second stage of our model is the increasing assertiveness of the new logic. While Stage 1 sees 
the effective introduction of the incoming logic and the emergence of a well-functioning hybrid, the 
move towards destabilization begins in Stage 2. This is the stage where the role of audience feedback 
becomes apparent: as performance improvements are recognized, leading to acclamation by audiences, 
incumbents become encouraged and feel empowered to look at the means by which the incoming logic 
might be further used. Performance improvements become particularly influential if they are widely 
seen and acknowledged as arising from the changes made by the incoming logic, and if the benefits are 
mutually shared. These criteria are especially important where the incoming logic is regarded with high 
suspicion and where the incumbent logic has high status. As such, acclamation can have positive effects 
for the functioning of the hybrid and the enactment of the new logic settlement. But the potential for 
destabilization arises when audience feedback nurtures two mechanisms: narrower attention and efforts 
by incomers to undermine incumbents’ discretion over core practices. 
Narrower attention occurs when logic proponents court and respond to praise from audiences of 
particular relevance to them. For example, the relevant audience for professionals is that of the 
profession (the association and peers) and it is feedback from that audience to which they are expressly 
attentive (Friedson 1986, Greenwood et al. 2002). Such praise, moreover, can motivate groups to 
become correspondingly ‘deaf’ to the feedback and concerns of other audiences; they become 
consumed with ‘their’ world. Narrower logic attention, in other words, contains a measure of hubris – 
a sense of exaggerated self-confidence (Hayward and Hambrick 1997) – that encourages those 
promoting a particular logic to advocate their logic as deserving of greater priority and to push for its 
further application. 
By itself, narrower logic attention can provide benefits because audience-level praise enhances the 
receptivity of actors to newly introduced ideas and provides the motivation to adopt further changes 
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(cf., McPherson and Sauder 2013). However, our insight is that acclamation can push the benefits of 
familiarity towards dysfunctional levels by encouraging proponents of logics to become overly 
assertive. Buoyed by their acclaimed role in the organization’s performance, incoming actors can go 
beyond the careful persuasion of others to a more confident and forceful advocacy of their worldview. 
Acclamation, in other words, can trigger a second mechanism, which sees incomers seeking to 
undermine incumbents’ discretion over decision making, leading to significant changes in the 
enactment of core practices.  
However, this deepening of the new logic into core practices may not immediately be resisted. 
Indeed, applications of the incoming logic may be accepted because they are assumed to underpin the 
performance improvements garnering praise among audiences. Acclamation from important 
stakeholders, in other words, influences the behaviors of incumbents as they come to enjoy, even relish, 
the praise they receive – especially, as in R-hospital, if the praise is unexpected. The glow of ‘success’ 
can flatter incumbents into complying with recommended changes – even though doing so weakens the 
very autonomy and discretion that were earlier regarded as sacrosanct. Thus acclamation can, at least 
temporarily, subdue the risk of contestation that might otherwise arise from narrower logic attention 
and the growing influence of the incoming logic upon core practices.  
The result is a relative re-prioritization of logics in favor of the incoming logic as that logic becomes 
acknowledged as a positive and important influence upon organizational performance and therefore 
deserving of greater involvement in organizational decision-making. The incoming logic thereby 
extends further into core organizational practices which, crucially, may compromise the standards of 
incumbent logics – a potentially dangerous outcome for the organizations concerned. However, this 
outcome is not associated with the contestation that would have occurred in Stage 1. Instead, that 
potential for contestation is held in check by the enjoyment of audience-level acclamation.  
The third and final stage of our model is the rejection of the new logic. The lack of contestation 
evident in Stage 2 depends on sustained audience-level acclamation. If that feedback turns from praise 
to criticism, as it did in our case, and those promoting the incumbent logics interpret the negative 
feedback as reflecting upon their competence, these actors will question the changes that have been 
introduced. Specifically, criticism triggers two other mechanisms that fracture relations between the 
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proponents of the different logics. First, logic contestation emerges as the different groups feel the shock 
of negative feedback and seek to attribute blame. When incumbent actors realize the implications of 
what has happened, their earlier fears about the new logic are resurrected, and they turn against the 
incomers: they will support change only as long as their own legitimacy is not jeopardized; but, once 
their integrity is impugned, they will distance themselves from the newly introduced arrangements. 
Those promoting the incoming logic, on the other hand, will ignore or downplay that criticism if ‘their’ 
audiences continue to convey praise. For them, the hubris associated with narrower logic attention 
continues to drive their behavior.  
Second, incumbents reassert their discretion over core practices by resisting the influence of the 
incoming logic and reclaiming control over core practices; actions that are designed to affirm the 
prioritization of the logic that they embody, and marginalize the influence of the incoming logic. The 
consequence is an escalation of tensions and disputes. Hubris on both sides – exacerbated when some 
audiences are critical whereas others remain positive – prevents an easy compromise. In these 
circumstances of extreme conflict, it is difficult for the revised ‘settlement’ to survive: instead, the 
outcome is the restoration of the original hybrid organizational form as incumbents push out the 
incoming logic. 
In sum, our process model reveals a cycle of gains, compromise and restoration. Positive audience 
feedback leads incumbents to support changes in practices, even beyond the point at which it becomes 
clear that the changes are not viable; but signals of disapproval precipitate rapid withdrawal of that 
support, followed by political strife and the rejection of the incoming logic.  
We believe that R-Hospital provides an excellent context for building new theory about the 
dynamics of logic acceptance and rejection in hybrid organizations. At the same time, it is based on the 
case of a single organization, and it is therefore important that we consider the boundary conditions of 
our model and the extent that it can be “transferred” (Lincoln and Guba 1985) to other settings. In this 
regard, we highlight several features of our case. First, we focused on an established organization and 
the dynamics that we identify may not apply directly to newly formed hybrids. Second, the incoming 
logic in our case is a private logic – a logic that exerts particular influence in market economies 
(Kitchener 2002) but which was alien to our focal organization. Again, the dynamics of our case may 
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not hold exactly in situations where the incoming logic is of a different kind. Third, the dominant 
incumbent logic in our case is the very high status medical professional logic whose promoters are 
especially protective of their autonomy (Chreim et al. 2007). One might imagine a different set of 
dynamics if the incumbent logic is of lower status than the one being introduced. Fourth, acclamation 
in our case was driven by significant performance improvements following the introduction of the new 
logic. Without these major improvements, and the associated gains, the organization may not have 
progressed beyond Stage 1. Finally, our case is of a hospital in Italy, a country with a long tradition of 
publicly funded healthcare and no tradition of private investment in the public system. Thus, while our 
findings are likely to resonate in contexts with similar funding arrangements (such as Canada, Australia, 
the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe) they may do so less strongly in countries such as the 
US where private actors have long been deeply implicated in healthcare delivery. 
 More broadly, given that other hybrids have avoided the fate of R-Hospital, it is important to 
consider whether the outcome observed in our case was inevitable. Could it have been avoided? Several 
studies highlight the critical role of managers capable of holding multiple value sets and of enacting 
them in practice (e.g., Besharov 2014, Smith 2014, Battilana et al. 2015). The implication is that 
supportive hierarchical arrangements within an organization are necessary if an appropriate settlement 
between logics is to be sustained. In our case, there was an absence of such “pluralist managers” 
(Besharov 2014) and once the internal balance began to be lost there were no countervailing pulls for 
its restoration. Also absent were “spaces of negotiation” (Battilana et al., 2015) that might have 
encouraged the working through of tensions and differences by bringing contesting parties together. On 
the contrary, in our case the physicians withdrew from exchanges with proponents of the private logic. 
Finally, there was an absence of supportive structures in the institutional environment such as those 
noted by Purdy and Gray (2009) and by Smith et al. (2012). It is difficult to assess the extent to which 
this absence contributed to the rejection of the private logic at R-Hospital, but a more mature 
institutional context may have tempered – at least to an extent – the forces of destabilization we 
observed.  
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Contributions To Research On Hybrid Organizing  
Our model highlights that the introduction of a new logic is not an event but an unfolding process. It 
also emphasizes that the relationships between external audiences and actors promoting different logics 
within an organization are fundamental in shaping that process. Once an alien logic has been introduced, 
the defining influence upon how events unfold is audience-level feedback – both positive and negative. 
Acclamation triggers narrower logic attention and the growing application of the incoming logic to core 
practices – even if doing so results in some compromising of standards. Acclamation across audiences 
also lowers the risk of resistance or even the expression of concern about the deterioration in 
performance. Criticism, in contrast, leads to disruption. As our case shows, the introduction of change, 
however careful, generates only a tentative settlement, and the turn from praise to criticism reignites 
the earlier concerns of incumbents about an alien logic. This sequence of acceptance followed by 
rejection runs counter to McPherson and Sauder’s (2013) suggestion that growing “familiarity” will 
promote logic compatibility and enable further inclusion of the incoming logic. In contrast to that study, 
our case shows that the bumping of logics can work against stabilization rather than for it, even after an 
initial period of effective adoption and implementation. 
Our study is not unique in showing that hybrid organizations can oscillate markedly between their 
constituent parts – work on hybrids from the perspectives of institutional theory, identity, and paradox 
has revealed this dynamic. For example, Ramus et al. (2017) show how a radical change in the 
environmental conditions facing Work Integration Social Enterprises in Italy dramatically increased the 
importance of the “commercial logic” relative to the “social logic”, which created internal tensions (see 
also Jay 2013, Pache and Santos 2013). From an identity standpoint, Ashforth and Reingen (2014) show 
how “oscillating decisions and actions” (p. 475) in a natural food co-operative shifted power between 
groups who had different perspectives about the appropriate balance between social and business 
purposes (see also Besharov 2014, Wry and York 2017). And from a paradox perspective, Smith and 
Besharov (2017) show how a Cambodian social enterprise shifted from a focus on “helping the most 
disadvantaged” to “building a sustainable business” (see also Bednarek et al. 2017, Smith et al. 2012). 
Crucially, what our study adds to this important stream of work, which builds theory about how such 
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oscillations can be managed and contained, is a theoretical explanation of hybrid disruption that is so 
severe that the organization cannot adequately function, leading to the rejection of a logic. 
Our model provides a second important insight for understanding hybrid organizations: namely, that 
for a new logic to be incorporated effectively into a mature organization, incumbent discretion over 
core practices should not be disturbed. The introduction of a logic perceived by incumbents as 
fundamentally challenging of their values can only be accomplished if the incoming actors work to 
support existing organizational goals. Even after its effective adoption, and in the face of demonstrated 
benefits, attempts by incomers to undermine incumbents’ capacity to enact core practices in accordance 
with their logic is likely to result in contestation because doing so risks the compromising of standards. 
In particular, the effective introduction of an alien logic requires organizational members to avoid the 
seductive influences of narrower logic attention. But, as our case suggests, this is a difficult requirement 
to meet. Narrower attention is a profound mechanism that can outweigh political astuteness and drive 
an organization towards internal conflict. In our case, the mechanism was displayed in the behavior of 
the private actors as they pushed the application of their logic without regard for professionals’ 
(previously sacrosanct) discretion over core practices, and in their insistence upon doing so even in the 
face of sudden and aggressive opposition. Yet, these same actors had shown by the manner of their 
entry into R-Hospital considerable political astuteness. Their failure to retain their political sensitivity 
indicates that the destabilizing effect of narrower attention can prevail even in the case of actors who 
might be expected to be immune from its influence.  
Contributions To Institutional Theory 
The above discussion speaks to the literature on hybrid organizations. But insights provided by our case 
also have relevance for institutional theorizing more broadly. In particular, the process model that we 
have developed calls into question two core assumptions within the institutional literature: that social 
endorsement is advantageous; and, that alignment with institutional prescriptions results in stabilization.  
     Contrary to current theorizing, which assumes that organizations aligned with their environment are 
institutionally advantaged (Deephouse et al. 2017, Scott 2013), our study suggests that positive signals 
of social legitimacy may, over time, prove to be problematic and ultimately impede performance. 
Specifically, organizations that meet institutional demands may invoke audience praise and 
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endorsement, but that praise may arouse the disruptive mechanism of narrower logic attention. 
Alignment, in other words, is a double-edged sword that, as well as promising positive outcomes such 
as protection from institutional scrutiny and better access to resources (Scott, 2008), can lead to 
dysfunctional outcomes. These outcomes transpire not simply because of conflicting expectations on 
the part of different audiences as suggested in existing work (Greenwood et al. 2011), but because high 
levels of audience praise distort organizational priorities and decision making.  
     A second assumption in the institutional literature is that once organizations have achieved alignment 
with their context, organizational arrangements will stabilize and endure (Greenwood et al. 2011, Hardy 
and Maguire 2017). That assumption, however, is based upon a portrayal of organizations as 
homogeneous. A more nuanced depiction would recognize that occupational communities within 
organizations are selectively attentive to audience-level referents of ‘their’ logic. Yet, despite 
appreciation within organization theory more broadly that complex organizations are heterogeneous, 
institutional analysis has “neglected the intra-organizational level” (Battilana and Dorado 2010, p.1435; 
although see Raffaelli and Glynn 2014, Souitaris et al. 2012, and Binder, 2007). Our contribution to 
this debate is that the degree of alignment between an organization and its institutional context is not a 
fixed but a dynamic arrangement shaped by the organization’s multiple relationships with audiences, 
and by the pattern and tone of feedback received from them. Settlements, in other words, can be very 
tentative rather than solidly entrenched, which means that destabilization – not stabilization – may be 
the likely trajectory and outcome of institutional alignment.  
Conclusion 
Organizational forms that bring together ideas and practices from multiple institutional logics are often 
positioned as a panacea for the most deep-rooted social problems for which there are no obvious 
solutions. The effective management of such organizations is bound to be challenging as they are 
predicated on institutional contradiction. Moreover, as our case shows, the apparently smooth adoption 
of a logic may be temporary and fleeting. The dynamic we observed between logic acceptance and logic 
rejection may be a core feature of hybrid organizing and we have developed a framework to account 
for why multi-logic organizations can switch quickly, and with little warning, from one to the other. 
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While we have analyzed a single case, we believe that the insights we offer have broader applicability 
and hope that others will build on our findings to extend understanding of this important area of inquiry. 
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Table 1: Data Sources 
Data source Detail 
Observations (86 meetings, 1,468 pages) 
Organization- level decision making Bimonthly Board Meetings (6 meetings)  
Meetings for the Accreditation Process (10 meetings)  
Meetings for Monitoring of Procurement Activities, Budget and Trade Unions negotiations (5 meetings) 
Other organization-level staff meetings (14 meetings) 
Professional activities Weekly planning Meeting (20 meetings) 
Interdisciplinary team consultations – first and follow up visits (20 meetings), for a total of 140 patients over 6 months 
Daily informal exchanges 
Public events Local community events (11 events) – e.g., open days at R-Hospital, town council meetings regarding R-Hospital, press conferences  
Interviews (131 interviews, 3080 pages)  
Preliminary interviews Preliminary interviews with senior managers and shareholders (16 interviews)  
Semi-structured interviews Ethnographic interviews with employees (101 interviews)  
Informal exchanges on a daily basis  
Semi-structured interviews with shareholders (4 interviews) 
Follow-up interviews Follow-up interviews with senior medical staff (10 interviews) 
Archival documents (374 documents, 23 video) 
Organization- level decision making Minutes of Board meetings prior to field entry (2004-2010) (38 documents) 
All Documents related to budget negotiation, code for procurement, agreements with trade unions (81 documents) 
Professional activities Internal Procedures on patient management and on ward activity planning (32 documents) 
Public documents Local, regional and national newspaper articles 2003-2011 (223 articles) 
Video recordings of R-Hospital (23 video) 
 
 
Table 2a: Stage 1 – Constructs and Illustrative Data 
Constructs Illustrative data 
1. Audience skepticism “When we arrived, we did not find a sympathetic community… indeed, the local population was skeptical about our chances of turning the old 
public hospital into an efficient health facility” (CEO, interview) 
“The new private management will have to prove itself in the next few months” (newspaper article #5) 
2. Assurance: 
-private actors portray 
themselves as supportive of 
professional goals 
-public and professionals 
actors accept this view 
“The CEO and his staff were definitely supportive in the early years. They always remarked that the private investor had invested in the facility 
not to make profit but to support the consolidation of a specialized hospital in the local area” (physician #3, interview) 
“I knew very well that private investors in healthcare had traditionally very hard times in this Region. R-Hospital was a true “experiment” in 
this sense and it would have been deleterious to enter the partnership with the idea of being the big boss” (CEO, informal exchange) 
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3. Incumbents maintain 
discretion over core 
practices: 
-professional logic 
prioritized in work practices 
Professional logic: 
-  Admission practices  
“At the beginning we compiled the patients’ admission list based exclusively on criteria of medical priority” (physician #4) 
“We respected the work of physicians. There was indeed little incentive for us to interfere in physicians’ work. We hardly complained on 
issues such as bed occupation or pushed for specific types of patients” (Administrative Director) 
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices 
“In the first few years at R-Hospitals we learned through our own day-to-day experience how to set up and improve patients’ treatments” 
(physician #3)  
“The transition from a generalist to a rehabilitation hospital – and the set-up of the related treatment procedures - was done by the healthcare 
professionals, (CEO) 
-  Discharge practices 
“In 2006 we set up a discharge protocol detailing for each category of patients the average hospitalization length and the recommended time 
for discharge, based on the best international guidelines. We followed the protocol carefully with each patient” (physician #3) 
“When I arrived in R-Hospital in 2006 I had no say on physicians’ practices such as when and how to discharge patients” (clerk #2) 
Public logic:  
-  Admission practices  
“Originally, we did not consider R-Hospital a hub of the public health network. Patients of our local health unit were primarily referred to other 
hospitals in the nearby area” (LHU member #6) 
“In the early years of R-Hospital, we had no formal agreements on the transfer of incoming patients with the public hospitals in our local health 
unit. Thus, the Local health unit did not exert any strong role as coordinator of the health network on us” (physician #3) 
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices 
“We had no voice in the treatment of patients. This was a physician’s task” (LHU member #1) 
“I cannot remember any systematic attempt by the LHU to interfere with our treatment procedures (physician #2) 
-  Discharge practices 
“At the beginning we left R-Hospital grow up as an independent facility. I must acknowledge we resisted the idea of considering it at the same 
level of the other public facilities. Patients’ discharge paths in our LHU did not include R-Hospital” (LHU member #1) 
“Being a pretty peripheral facility, and with most orthopedic patients going back home after the discharge, we felt limited pressure to 
coordinate the patient post-discharge with other local public facilities” (physician #5) 
Private logic: 
-  Admission practices  
“We had little voice in the decisions regarding patients’ selection” (CEO) 
“When the private actors entered our hospital, they did not force us to focus on specific categories of patients. Indeed, mos t of our patients 
were orthopedic (i.e., less remunerative patients) rather than neurological” (physician #1) 
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices 
“Physicians were originally skeptical about the new management and we were careful not to be overly present in their everyday work” 
(administrative director) 
“There was little interference by non-professionals over the choice of patients’ treatments. Administrators hardly entered into our business” 
(physician #2) 
-  Discharge practices 
“We introduced the DRG system. We did so through the involvement of external doctors who interacted directly with our physicians" (CEO) 
 “The obsession to comply with the average hospitalization length set up by the remunerated DRG was not felt in the early years” (physician #2) 
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Table 2b: Stage 2 – Constructs and Illustrative Data 
Constructs Illustrative data 
4. Audience acclamation “The new hospital is exceeding expectations. It is quickly growing in the local area” (local newspaper 2009). 
“R-Hospital is a management model to be exported. This is demonstrated by the economic results, but also by the patient satisfaction 
feedback, that is constantly monitored by the regional Offices” (Regional Health Councilor, 2009, public speech) 
5. Narrower attention: 
- public, private and professional 
actors increase the interactions 
with their field level referents 
-limited concern about feedback 
from other groups, lack of 
reciprocal knowledge of 
accomplishments 
-private actors become assertive 
“The Clinical Director announced he had been nominated a member of the National Commission on New Rehabilitation Techniques and, by 
doing so, all of them would have the opportunity to shape concretely the future of rehabilitation” (observation, internal meeting). 
“In the past three years we have moved from having no external engagements with the scientific community to having all physicians 
submitting abstracts to the national conference” (Clinical Director, interview). 
“In September 2010 the CEO received two visits from CEOs of foreign health clinics interested in learning the business model of R-
Hospital” (R-Hospital 2010 Annual Report).  
“The success of this hospital derives from the managerial capacities of all of us (referring to the colleagues working in the administrative 
unit) who have been able to turn a dead facility into a vibrant hub” (Administrative Director, interview). 
6. Incoming actors undermine 
incumbents’ discretion over core 
practices: 
-private and public actors align 
and exert pressure on 
professionals  
-professional, private and 
public logics equally prioritized 
in work practices 
Professional logic (43 decisions, 31%) 
-  Admission practices (11 decisions, 30%) 
“Mr. Casper (pseudonym) and Mr. Roger (pseudonym) are on our waiting list and they are both orthopedic patients type b. The former, 
however, has a higher rehabilitation potential and should be hospitalized first.” (physician #8) 
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices (12 decisions, 44%) 
“Diagnostic test (anonymized) is essential for Patient 69. Let’s plan it for early next week” (physician #11) 
-  Discharge practices (20 decisions, 27%) 
“Patient 62 has completed her rehabilitation path. We can discharge her tomorrow morning” (physician #7) 
Public logic (44 decisions, 32%) 
-  Admission practices (12 decisions, 32%) 
“We need two beds for Patients 54 and 55. They are exceptions to our admission rules, but the LHU hospital asked us to admit them” 
(physician #11) 
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices (8 decisions, 30%) 
“Whenever we need patients to take test (anonymized), we will send them to the nearby public hospital” (physician #7) 
-  Discharge practices (24 decisions, 32%) 
“Patient 62 has completed her rehabilitation path, but we should keep her in our ward an extra day until she is admitted to Hospice Alpha” 
(physician #10)  
Private logic (51 decisions, 37%) 
-  Admission practices (14 decisions, 38%) 
“We cannot lower the threshold of 100% of bed saturation and, in redistributing beds, remember to keep at least 25 beds for type A patients 
(more remunerative patients)” (physician #9)  
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices (7 decisions, 26%) 
"We can avoid taking this extra diagnostic examination for Patient 59” (physician #10) 
-  Discharge practices (30 decisions, 41%) 
“With this type of patients, try not to exceed the hospitalization length set by the respective DRG, as this would cut the re imbursement rate 
by 25%” (physician #3) 
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Table 2c: Stage 3 – Constructs and Illustrative Data 
Constructs Illustrative data 
7. Audience criticism “Between 2009 and 2010 patients were hospitalized on average 20% longer, with decreasing rehabilitation improvements” (data retrieved for 
external accreditation report) 
“Patient #101 complained about the delay in the use of the rehabilitation gym. Apparently it was overbooked due to the increase in the number 
of outpatient patients” (observation, ward field notes) 
8. Logic contestation 
-professional and public 
actors re-align and exclude 
private actors 
- private actors continue to 
be assertive 
“It is time to reassert our role in R-Hospital” (Clinical Director, observation) 
“The CEO seems to forget that R-Hospital is still a public hospital operating within our LHU network. Hence, any decision should be 
discussed and agreed upon with us and with the professionals” (LHU director, interview) 
“The outpatient budget will continue to increase next year” (2011 Outpatient Budget Plan)  
9. Incumbents reassert 
discretion over core 
practices: 
-professional logic prioritized 
in work practices 
Professional logic (86 decisions, 85%): 
-  Admission practices (17 decisions, 85%) 
“In planning next week admissions, let’s make sure we prioritize patients with high rehabilitation potential, regardless of the reimbursement 
level” (physician #13) 
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices (24 decisions, 83%) 
“We are entitled to plan the most effective treatments for our patients. If we believe Patient 87 needs an extra diagnostic test, we will carry it 
out” (physician #12) 
-  Discharge practices (45 decisions, 87%) 
“The DRG should not be seen as a constraint, rather as a guideline for our work. Discharge happens only at the end of the rehabilitation path” 
(physician #2) 
Public logic (8 decisions, 8%) 
-  Admission practices (1 decision, 5%) 
“Let’s make an exception to the rule only for this time and hospitalize patient 101 coming from the local hospital” (physician #) 
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices (3 decisions, 10%) 
“We will send patient 140 to take the diagnostic test in the LHU hospital only because we cannot run such a test here” (physician #13) 
-  Discharge practices (4 decisions, 8%) 
“I know we are not responsible for post-discharge, but we can support the LHU rehabilitation center with the discharge of patients 97 and 
100” (physician #12) 
Private logic (7 decisions, 7%) 
-  Admission practices (2 decisions, 10%) 
“We will prioritize the admission of patient 89 on that of patient 92 only because they display the same level of rehabilitat ion potential” 
(physician #7) 
-  Diagnosis and treatment practices (2 decisions, 7%) 
“We have no certainty that this extra test would make a different for patient 99. Let’s avoid making it for this time” (physician #9) 
-  Discharge practices (3 decisions, 6%) 
“For patient 92 we can keep the discharge date of 28 days set by the DRG. It is a good compromise and the patient will recover fully by that 
date” (physician #7) 
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Figure 1: A Process Model of Logic Acceptance and Rejection in Hybrid Organizations 
 
 
